The role of the exchange rate for adjustment in boom and bust episodes by Martin, Reiner et al.
Working PaPer SerieS
no 813 / SEPTEMBER 2007
The role of The 
exchange raTe 
for adjuSTmenT  
in Boom and
BuST ePiSodeS
by Reiner Martin,  
Ludger Schuknecht  
and Isabel VansteenkisteWorking PaPer SerieS
no 813 / SePtember 2007
In 2007 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the  
20 banknote.
the role of the exchange 
rate for adjuStment in 
boom and
buSt ePiSodeS 1
by Reiner Martin,   
Ludger Schuknecht   
and Isabel Vansteenkiste 2
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1015256.
1   Valuable research assistance by Gerhard Schwab, Tobias Blattner and Ieva Rubene and editorial support by Sarah Whitehead, 
Saskia Schwaegermann and Stefanie Peuckmann is most appreciated. Comments by Antonio Afonso, Marcel Fratzscher,   
Lars Jonung, Hans Joachim Klöckers, José Marin, Philipp Rother, Livio Stracca, Max Watson, an anonymous referee, and   
the participants of the Second DG ECFIN Research Conference, European Commission, Brussels 6-7 October 2005,   
the IMF-EUR seminar in Washington on 29 June 2006 and the DG-Economics seminar of the ECB were very helpful.   
The views represented are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the ECB.
2   All authors: European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; email: reiner.martin@ecb.int,   
ludger.schuknecht@ecb.int and isabel.vansteenkiste@ecb.int© European Central Bank, 2007
Address 
Kaiserstrasse 29 
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Postal address 
Postfach 16 03 19 
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000 
Telex 
411 144 ecb d 
All rights reserved. 
Any  reproduction,  publication  and 
reprint  in  the  form  of  a  different 
publication, whether printed or produced 
electronically,  in  whole  or  in  part,  is 
permitted  only  with  the  explicit  written 
authorisation of the ECB or the author(s). 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The  statement  of  purpose  for  the  ECB 
Working  Paper  Series  is  available  from 
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.europa. 
eu/pub/scientific/wps/date/html/index.
en.html
ISSN 1561-0810 (print) 
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)ECB




Non-technical summary  5
1  Introduction  7
2  Conceptual isssues  8
  2.1  Transmission channels  8
	 2.2	 Identification	of	booms	and	busts	 9
  2.3  Internal versus external adjustment  10
  2.4    Country and variable choice and  
“road map” for discussion  10
3    Analysing past boom-bust episodes in  
industrialised economies  12
  3.1    Stylised facts on boom-bust episodes in 
industrialized countries in the 1980s and 90s  12
  3.2  Econometric analysis  18
4    The Central and East European EU  
Member States  22
5  Conclusions  28
References  30
Annexes Table: Data and sources  32
European Central Bank Working Paper Series  334
ECB
Working Paper Series No 813
September 2007  
 
Abstract: Numerous countries have experienced boom-bust episodes in asset prices in the past 20 
years. This study looks at stylised facts and conducts statistical and econometric analysis for such 
episodes, distinguishing between industrialised countries that experienced external adjustment (via 
real  effective  exchange  rate  depreciation  during  busts)  and  those  that  relied  on  an  internal 
adjustment process (and experienced no depreciation).  
The  study  finds  that  different  adjustment  experiences  are  correlated  with  the  degree  of 
macroeconomic imbalances and balance sheet problems. Internal adjustment seems more prevalent 
when financial vulnerabilities, excess demand and competitiveness loss remain relatively contained 
in the boom. In the bust, internal adjusters experience more protracted but less deep downturns than 
external adjusters as imbalances unwind more slowly.  
Some Central and East European EU Member States are currently experiencing strong credit and 
asset  price  growth  in  conjunction  with  rapid  economic  expansion.  Against  this  background  the 
experience of other countries may raise awareness of related policy challenges. 
 
Key  words:  Booms  and  busts,  external  and  internal  adjustment,  exchange  rates,  financial 
imbalances, competitiveness 
 
JEL codes: E32, E63, E65 
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What have been the experiences with boom-bust episodes that have affected numerous countries 
over the past 20 years? What role has the exchange rate played for adjustment? These are the first 
questions that this study tries to answer by deriving stylised facts and conducting statistical and 
econometric analysis on a number of boom-bust episodes in industrialised countries.  
 
Many of these episodes have already been studied extensively but often on a country basis. This 
study takes a more comprehensive view and looks at experiences and patterns across industrialised 
countries and compares this with the situation in a number of Central and East European (CEE) EU 
Member States. Moreover, the study analyses exchange rate adjustment patterns in the face of busts. 
It differentiates between those countries that experienced a (CPI-based) real effective exchange rate 
depreciation/devaluation during the bust, which we call “external adjusters”, and those that did not 
experience a devaluation, which we call “internal adjusters”.  
 
The findings of the study support the claim that real and financial variables interact in boom-bust 
episodes where asset price cycles and their impact on private balance sheets constitute an important 
driving  force.  Most  importantly,  countries’  different  exchange  rate  adjustment  experiences  are 
correlated  with  the  extent  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  the  degree  of  balance  sheet 
vulnerability. Together with relatively loose fiscal policies, this appears to have stoked asset price 
and consumer price inflation and domestic demand. At the same time it reinforced competitiveness 
losses  in  the  boom  which  –  when  fortunes  reversed  –  exacerbated  the  bust  and  the  resulting 
adjustment needs. In those cases where the exchange rate was devalued, this shift in policy first 
reinforced balance sheet problems in the private sector but then precipitated a rapid recovery. From 
this we conclude: 
 
•  External  adjusters  tend  to  experience  more  pronounced  booms  with  more  overheating  of 
demand, increases in prices and credit, loss of competitiveness and deterioration of (private 
sector, external and public) balance sheets than reported for internal adjusters.  
 
•  In  busts,  external  adjusters  tend  to  experience  deep  downturns  and  rapid  recoveries  as 
imbalances  are  initially  more  severe  but,  subsequently,  also  unwind  more  quickly.  Internal 
adjusters  tend  to  face  less  deep  but  more  protracted  downturns  (and  even  deflation)  as 
imbalances unwind more slowly and adjustment via the trade and credit channels takes more 
time.  
 
•  Statistical and preliminary econometric analysis broadly confirms stylised facts on boom-bust 
episodes,  with  domestic  and  international  financial  variables  appearing  to  have  the  most 
significant predictive power for the most likely pattern of exchange rate adjustment. 
 
The study seems to confirm many “orthodox” messages: 
 
•  The  more  significant  demand  and  financial  excesses,  competitiveness  loss,  and  fiscal  and 
external imbalances in the course of the boom the more likely it seems that a country would be 
found in the group of external adjusters in the bust. 
 
•  Internal adjustment appears to be more prevalent when external and fiscal imbalances are small, 
and when credit growth, inflation and competitiveness loss is contained during the boom 
 
With regard to the CEE EU Member States, the study suggests that some of these are currently 
experiencing strong credit and asset price growth in conjunction with rapid economic expansion. 
Clear and definite conclusions regarding these countries’ situation and prospects can not be drawn 
yet, not least due to the serious data problems that complicate inter alia a detailed examination of 
asset price developments and balance-sheet vulnerabilities, but also due to the difficulties associated 6
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with  distinguishing  booms  from  catching-up  effects.  In  addition,  the  institutional  framework 
provided by EU membership and the prospect of euro adoption – once the CEE countries fulfill the 
Maastricht  convergence  criteria  –  are  specific  to  this  group  of  countries.  Nevertheless  the 
experiences  of  boom-bust  scenarios  in  other  countries  may  raise  awareness  of  related  policy 
challenges in the CEE countries.  7
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1. Introduction  
What have been the experiences with boom-bust episodes that have affected numerous countries 
over the past 20 years? What role has the exchange rate played for adjustment?   
 
These are the first questions that this study tries to answer by deriving stylised facts on a number 
of boom-bust episodes. Many of these episodes have already been studied extensively but often on a 
country basis. This study takes a more comprehensive view and looks at experiences and patterns 
across different industrialised countries and compares this with the situation in a number of Central 
and East European (CEE) EU Member States.  
 
Moreover,  the  study  analyses  patterns  of  exchange  rate  adjustment  in  the  face  of  busts.  It 
differentiates between those countries that experienced a (CPI-based) real effective exchange rate 
depreciation/devaluation during the bust, which we call “external adjusters”, and those that did not 
experience a devaluation, which we call “internal adjusters”.  
 
The study looks at the interaction of real and financial sector variables in boom-bust episodes 
where asset price cycles and their impact on private balance sheets constitute an important driving 
force.  Volatility  can  be  reinforced  (or  moderated)  through  domestic  macroeconomic  factors, 
competitiveness developments and the international financial environment. We first derive stylised 
facts for different country groups by examining a number of relevant flow and stock variables. In 
addition, we conduct statistical and econometric analyses as regards the incidence and patterns of 
boom and bust episodes and the type of adjustment (external vs internal) that countries experienced.  
 
The study finds that countries’ different (exchange rate) adjustment experiences are correlated 
with the extent of macroeconomic imbalances and balance sheet deterioration.  
 
•  External  adjusters  tend  to  experience  more  pronounced  booms  with  more  overheating  of 
demand, increases in prices and credit, loss of competitiveness and deterioration of (private, 
public and external) balance sheets than reported for internal adjusters.   
 
•  In  busts,  external  adjusters  tend  to  experience  deep  downturns  and  rapid  recoveries  as 
imbalances  are  initially  more  severe  but,  subsequently,  also  unwind  more  quickly.  Internal 
adjusters tend to face less deep but more protracted downturns as imbalances unwind more 
slowly and adjustment via the trade and credit channels takes more time.  
 
•  Statistical and preliminary econometric analysis broadly confirms stylised facts on boom bust 
episodes,  with  domestic  and  international  financial  variables  appearing  to  have  the  most 
significant predictive power for the role of the exchange rate in adjustment. 
 
What is the current situation of the CEE EU Member States? The analysis of these countries 
suggests  that  some  of  them  are  currently  experiencing  strong  credit  and  asset  price  growth  in 
conjunction  with  rapid  economic  expansion.  Clear  and  definite  conclusions  regarding  these 
countries’ situation and prospects can not be drawn yet, not least due to serious data problems as 
well as the difficulties associated with distinguishing booms from catching-up effects. Nevertheless 




The study has a number of shortcomings. The choice to discuss stylised facts for a relatively 
large number of countries comes at the expense of a more detailed analysis. Furthermore, we do not 
                                                      
3  In addition, with respect to the CEE EU Member States it is important to keep in mind that many boom 
episodes did not end in a bust period. Including such episodes and comparing them in a systematic way 
with the current situation in the CEE EU Member States is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.   8
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analyse whether countries “chose” a certain adjustment strategy or whether markets “forced” them 
to do so (or a mixture of the two).
4 We are mainly interested in detecting patterns of cross-country 
experiences  with  booms  and  busts  as  depending  on  the  different  exchange  rate  adjustment 
experience.  Moreover, we focus on the interaction of various transmission channels but not on 
institutional and micro-structural issues. Finally, the statistical and econometric analysis presents a 
first attempt to underpin the stylised facts with more rigorous analysis, keeping in mind that data 
shortcomings and a small sample size are limiting the scope of such an analysis. 
 
The study is organized as follows. The next section discusses conceptual issues, including the 
discussion of exchange rate adjustment experiences, the relevant sectoral variables and transmission 
channels  and  the  methodology  for  identifying  boom-bust  cycles.  Section  three  discusses  the 
experience of ten industrialised countries with boom-bust phases in the 1980s-1990s including an 
empirical analysis. Section 4 takes stock of the situation in CEE EU Member States. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual issues 
2.1  Transmission channels  
Boom-bust episodes are empirical phenomena. There is not just one and only one theoretical 
framework  that  defines  them  and  explains  their  emergence  and  evolution.  There  are  different 
theoretical approaches and measurement tools. Nevertheless, there is a considerable literature that 
looks at boom bust episodes primarily as a result of asset price “cycles” that propagate into the real 
economy via the credit transmission channel (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Bordo and 
Jeanne, 2002; Borio, 2005).
5 This channel also forms our conceptual basis for identifying boom-
bust  episodes.  However,  there  are  also  three  other  propagation  mechanisms  or  transmission 
channels  which  play  a  role  in  the  evolution  of  booms  and  busts  and  which  warrant  a  brief 
discussion: ii) the trade channel, iii) the international financial channel, and iv) the fiscal channel. 
 
As regards the first channel, the financial accelerator literature explains the emergence of boom-
bust  phenomena  in  the  real  and  financial  economy  via  asset  supply  rigidities  and  the  credit 
transmission channel. When asset prices rise, the collateral value of the assets increases which, in 
turn, stokes credit supply and demand. This in conjunction with wealth effects provokes further real 
demand, output and asset price rises. Asset supply increases and growth of debt cause this process 
to reverse at some point (putting pressure on prices and net worth), and the opposite, mutually 
reinforcing dynamics fuel the downturn of asset prices and the real economy.  
The second channel worth referring to in this context is the trade channel. In a period of strong 
growth, a country may lose competitiveness via rising unit labour costs. This initially further boosts 
domestic demand and imports but it undermines the tradable goods sector and export growth. Over 
time  the  weakening  effect  from  exports  and  the  trade-competing  sector  start  to  dominate, 
employment is falling, so that growth weakens. In the downturn and especially if a devaluation of 
the exchange rate takes place, relative price adjustments result in the revival of import-competing 
industries which together with rising exports helps the economy to emerge from the downturn. If 
the exchange rate is not devalued, the full adjustment has to come through a reversal of unit labour 
costs and relative prices between tradables/non-tradables before the revival of exports and import-
competing industries can set in. 
 
                                                      
4   The “choice” of adjustment strategy is to some extent “endogenous” to the extent of prevailing imbalances 
as larger imbalances ceteris paribus make internal adjustment more difficult/costly. 
5   A somewhat different approach where frictions from adjustment costs to investment and monopolistic 
competition  in  the  non-trade  goods  sector  can  generate  boom  bust  phenomena  in  dynamics  general 
equilibrium modelling is applied by Fagan and Gaspar (2005). 9
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The third channel is the international financial channel. Capital inflows in the boom/high 
growth period keep the exchange rate appreciated and imports cheap. Sudden stops of inflows and 
net capital outflows can exacerbate (if not trigger) the asset price bust and downturn of the real 
economy  by  choking  domestic  demand,  increasing  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate  and  on  the 
banking  system  (see  Calvo,  Izquierdo  and  Mejia,  2004;  Calvo,  Izquierdo  and  Talvi,  2003  or 
Eichengreen and Choudhry, 2005).  
 
Much attention has been drawn to international capital flows exacerbating booms. They can give 
rise  to  significant  short  term  and  foreign-currency  denominated  debt,  coupled  with  insufficient 
reserves.  If then the boom turns to bust, a reversal of capital flows may make the exchange rate 
untenable which, in turn, exacerbates the effect of asset price declines on collateral value and non-
performing loans and may even push the economy from “bust” into a “full-fledged” crisis. By 
contrast, the opposite case of countries experiencing capital inflows and pressure on their exchange 
rate to appreciate during bust phases has received much less attention. We will see below that this 
has been the experience of a number of countries whose currencies are considered safe havens 
including Switzerland and Japan. In these instances, relative prices in the tradable-non-tradable 
goods sectors in the bust have to adjust internally even more strongly.  
 
The role of public finances (or the fiscal channel) is little discussed in the boom-bust literature. 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) point to revenue windfalls during booms that derive from asset-based 
taxes and from indirect tax revenue that is boosted by wealth effects on domestic demand. These 
windfalls can be very significant. They can create incentives of pro-cyclical policies in the boom if 
such windfalls are not recognized as such and spent. Fiscal policies can also be (forced to become) 
pro-cyclical  in  the  downturn  if  the  fiscal  position  at  the  beginning  of  the  bust  is  weak  and 
adjustment  is  needed  to  prevent  destabilizing  deficit  increases.  Jaeger  and  Schuknecht  find 
significant evidence for such pro-cyclical policies in a study of industrialised country boom-bust 
episodes since the 1970s.  
 
Fiscal  policies  can  also  exacerbate  boom-bust  experiences  via  indirect  effects  through  other 
channels. The financing needs arising from large fiscal deficits can increase vulnerability via the 
international  financial  channel  if  such  deficits  raise  the  current  account  deficit  and  hence  the 
vulnerability to “sudden stops”. Fiscal policies can worsen imbalances via the competitiveness/trade 
and domestic financial channels if public wage and employment increases put pressure on unit 
labour costs and if these, in turn, stoke credit and asset price booms. 
 
The previous references to interlinkages between the sectoral channels, already point to the fact 
that vulnerabilities and risks need to be assessed from an inter-sectoral perspective. Or in other 
words, we need to look at systemic risks and not just at sectoral ones. The literature has started to 
acknowledge  the  importance  of  analysing  intersectoral  linkages,  especially  via  balance  sheet 
vulnerability (Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Setser and Roubini (2002). Boom-bust phenomena that in 
some cases culminate in financial/BOP crises are intellectually interesting because of these very 
complexities. Moreover, they are economically relevant because of the significant adjustment needs 
and the large output and fiscal costs that can arise in protracted busts or deep crises (Watson, 2005; 
Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Calvo et al).  
 
2.2  Identification of booms and busts  
But when is there a boom and bust? There is by now a considerable literature that develops 
methodologies of identifying such phenomena. These include Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Jaeger and 
Schuknecht  (2004),  or  Detken  and  Smets  (2004)  for  defining  boom  and  bust  episodes  in 
industrialized countries.  
 
In this study, we look at (i) boom-bust episodes in industrialised countries since the mid 1980s as 
identified in Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2004 and defined as phases of major and persistent upswings 10
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or downturns in asset price indices as derived by Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) and (ii) the 
situation of the CEE EU Member States, where in some cases strong growth is also coupled with 
anecdotal evidence of very significant asset price increases.  
 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) construct boom and bust phases in real asset prices by following a 
dating method initially proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002), based on the so-called triangular 
methodology. This technique identifies the peaks and troughs of the asset price series (their turning 
points) whereby asset price indicators include stocks and real estate depending on their weight in 
the asset composition of an economy. They then calculate the duration of the period from trough to 
peak (the upswing) and from peak to trough (the downturn) and the amplitude of the asset price 
changes over these periods. By multiplying duration and amplitude, they arrive at a ranking of asset 
price upswings and downturns of which the largest quintile is referred to as boom-bust episodes. 
This  enables  them  to  separate  booms  and  busts  in  asset  prices  from  more  normal  asset  price 
movements. The approach does not entail that a boom or a bust phase needs to be followed by 
another similar phase.  
 
This analysis is based on asset price data generated on the basis of the methodology described in 
Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). The relevant asset prices are real estate and stock prices from 
which a composite indicator is generated by splicing the series according to the relative value of 
housing and stock markets.
6 
 
2.3  Internal versus external adjustment 
When countries need to adjust in an environment turning from boom to bust as discussed above, 
they can either adjust through the exchange rate or the domestic price level or a combination of 
both. In this study we refer to external adjusters as those countries that saw the nominal exchange 
rate  depreciate  and  (due  to  inflation  differentials  with  trading  partners  being  smaller  than  the 
devaluation) also experienced a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. Internal adjusters 
are those countries that did not allow a depreciation or that experienced an appreciation of their real 
exchange rate through the depreciation of their trading partners. These countries had to correct real 
wage  or  tradable/non  tradable  sector  imbalances  via  domestic  price  adjustments  while  external 
adjusters primarily (though not necessarily exclusively) addressed imbalances through the exchange 
rate change.  
 
We  measure  exchange  rate  developments  via  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  that  adjusts 
nominal exchange rate changes for CPI differentials for the weighted average of trading partners. 
This is a more appropriate measure than unit labour cost-based measures which already include 
wage-based internal adjustment. 
 
2.4  Country and variable choice and “road map” for discussion  
Table 1 presents the countries we examine, the periods of booms and busts and the respective 
adjustment experience of each country. We initially apply a so-called case study approach. For all 
countries the first year of the bust are set as t1. Previous years cover the boom period and are 
counted backward. Following years cover the bust period . We normally look at 12 year windows 
from  t-6  to  t5  (unless  t1  is  so  recent  that  data  until  t5  is  not  yet  available).  We  also  conduct 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney tests to see whether differences in the means and variances of external 
and internal adjusters are “significant” and subsequently pursue an econometric analysis. 
 
 
                                                      
6 See Chart A3 for real estate prices in industrialized countries during the sample period. 11
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Table 1: Sample countries and relevant dates/episodes 
Country  Boom  Bust 
I. Industrialised countries, mid 1980s – early 1990s     
“External adjusters”     
Australia  1984-89  1990-95 
Canada  1985-89  1990-95 
Finland  1986-89  1990-93 
Italy    1991-97 
Spain  1985-90  1991-95 
Sweden  1986-89  1990-93 
United Kingdom  1983-89  1990-94 
“Internal adjusters”     
France  1986-90  1991-96 
Japan  1979-90  1991-02 
Switzerland  1983-89  1990-96 
II. Central and East European EU Member States  Observation period 
Bulgaria  All 1999-2006 
Czech Republic     
Estonia     
Hungary     
Latvia     
Lithuania     
Poland      
Romania     
Slovakia     
 
We look at a number of stock and flow variables that are most representative of the economic 
sectors and transmission channels discussed above. As shown in table 2, these include (i) output and 
demand related variables, (ii) credit and asset price variables and private sector debt (domestic 
financial  channel),  (iii)  real  effective  exchange  rate,  unit  labour  costs  and  export/GDP 
(trade/competitiveness  channel),  (iv)  the  current  account  and  external  financing  patterns  and 
external debt (international financial channel) and (v) public deficits and debt (fiscal channel). As 
will be seen, this matrix of variables can in reality not be discussed fully homogenously as there are 
significant  data  gaps.  But  it  provides  a  road  map  linking  the  conceptual  framework  with  the 
quantitative analysis below. 
Table 2: Sample countries and relevant dates/episodes 
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As  we  put  particular  emphasis  on  exchange  rate  developments  and  related  adjustment 
experiences, we will first distinguish external and internal adjusters according to their real effective 
exchange rate developments. The subsequent discussion starts from the presumption of a certain 
sequencing  in  boom-bust  episodes  that  also  suggests  a  certain  order  of the sectoral  discussion. 
Initially domestic financial and real variables seem to interact and produce a boom. We start with 




The trade and competitiveness channel tends to contribute to ending the boom and is therefore 
discussed thereafter. The international financial channel can already exacerbate the boom but since 
its greater relevance is for emerging markets and new member countries it is discussed fourth. 
Although public finances can exacerbate or moderate boom-bust episodes, the government often 
picks up the tap (as losses are socialized) and, hence, this channel is discussed last. 
 
3. Analysing past boom-bust episodes in industrialised economies 
3.1  Stylised facts on boom-bust episodes in industrialized countries in the 1980s 
and 90s  
This  section will  look  at case  studies  and  stylised facts  for  10 industrialised  country  which 
experienced (asset price) boom-bust episodes in the late 1980s and 1990s.
8 As we are particularly 
interested in the external environment and exchange rate policies, we will present stylised facts for 
1) the seven countries that experienced a depreciation of their real effective exchange rate in the 
bust. They include the UK, Sweden, Finland, Australia, Canada, Italy and Spain. These external 
adjusters  are  mostly  countries  that  had  relatively  fixed  exchange  rates  in  the  boom  but 
floated/devalued  their  currencies  early  in  the  bust.  2)  The  three  countries  that  experienced  an 
appreciation in the real effective exchange rate (CPI-based) in the bust. This group includes Japan, 
Switzerland  and  France  (called  internal  adjusters).  Two  of  the  internal  adjusters  had  floating 
currencies throughout the boom and bust (Japan and Switzerland). France maintained its peg to the 
DM (while widening the band) so that it experienced a relative appreciation as its main trading 
partners devalued.  
 
To prepare the discussion of stylised facts across economic sectors from the angle proposed 
above, we look at exchange rate developments in the sample countries. Chart A1 shows that over 
the  boom  period,  the  ten  countries  experienced  a  (CPI-based)  real  effective  exchange  rate 
appreciation (REER) by roughly 10% on average. This appreciation was more pronounced in the 
group of external adjusters, especially towards the end of the boom. Most interesting is the pattern 
during the bust: external adjusters show a strong depreciation in the REER as of the second/third 
year of the bust (when most sample countries actively devalued or floated their currencies). A 
continued, gradual appreciation was experienced by the internal adjusters.  
 
As  regards  the  real  economic  environment,  Chart  A2  shows  the  relatively  strong  growth 
performance in the boom of the late 1980s (t-5 to t0): three to four percent real growth. In the bust 
(t1-t6), growth not only fell rapidly but significant divergences across the two countries groups 
emerged. Amongst external adjusters growth fell very rapidly. Growth on average was negative by 
t2. This was followed by a sharp rebound in t3-t4.  Internal adjusters experienced a more gradual 
slowdown to near zero growth in t2 and t3. But the subsequent recovery was also much more 
                                                      
7   The reverse order is also conceivable (see e.g. Jonung, Schuknecht and Tujula, 2005) given that this is 
something of a “chicken and egg problem”. However, the more “conventional” ordering approach chosen 
in this study appeared to be a bit more reader-friendly. 
8   For earlier studies, applying a stylised facts approach on these phenomena see also Jaeger and Schuknecht 
(2004), Jonung, Schuknecht and Tujula (2005), and IMF (2000). 13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 813
September 2007
 
gradual: average growth only recovered to 1-2% by the end of the observation period. In more 
concrete terms, it reflects the experience of six years of very low growth in France and Switzerland 
and the very persistent weak growth performance of Japan. 
 
Turning to demand composition, all countries experienced a strong consumption and investment 
boom where average growth rates exceeded output growth (hence contributing to growing external 
imbalances). In the bust, the picture reversed with the result that cumulative positive departures 
from trend consumption and investment were balanced out or even overshot in the other direction in 
the  bust.
9  Consumption  and  investment  declines  were  even  steeper  in  the  group  of  external 
adjusters, in line with the picture for real output growth. 
 
Turning to the domestic financial environment, Chart A3 illustrates the significant real estate 
price cycle that was experienced over the boom and bust phase across all countries. Note that price 
increases  during  the  boom  were  somewhat  more  extreme  for  external  as  compared  to  internal 
adjusters. The real estate price cycle coincided with a distinct credit cycle where credit growth 
accelerated gradually until the end of the boom phase and decelerated sharply thereafter (Chart A4). 
The credit cycle was also more pronounced for the external adjusters. 
 
The credit and real estate boom led to a considerable build up of private sector debt in the boom 
that was (at least partly) reversed in the bust. However, good quality data for that period is only 
available for very few countries. Household and corporate debt ratios increased on average by 50% 
during the boom. This increase was largest in Japan (from 140% of GDP in 1980 to about 210% of 
GDP in 1991). On the whole, this picture is consistent with the view that the asset price cycle in 
conjunction  with  the  credit  channel  contributed  to  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  boom-bust 
phases. 
 
                                                      
9   Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) found that the average cumulative deviation from trend in booms and busts 
amounted to about 10% for consumption and about one quarter for investment. 14
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Inflation developments are also interesting and point to important problems in the policy mix for 
external adjusters (Chart A5). On the whole, inflation picked up rather gradually over the boom 
before declining in the downturn. But as regards the two country groups, external adjusters on 
average  experienced  significantly  higher  inflation  than  internal  adjusters  in  the  boom.  While 
inflation differentials were relatively moderate on a year-to-year basis (inflation peaked in t1 at 7% 
for the average of external adjusters versus 4% for internal adjusters) the differential accumulated 
over the years is nevertheless very significant. In the bust, external adjusters experienced continued 
inflation pressures partly as a result of significant exchange rate devaluations. 
 
The  different  inflation  performance  in  conjunction  with  the  credit  channel  could  be  an 
explanation  for  the  hammock-shaped  pattern  of  protracted  low  growth  experienced  by  internal 
adjusters during the bust that contrasts with the V-shaped pattern experienced by external adjusters. 
The high inflation rate of the external adjusters facilitated a rapid price adjustment in real estate 
markets without much of a nominal price fall (given that real estate prices tend to be nominally 
sticky). Low inflation countries, by contrast, experienced a much more protracted housing market 
adjustment. The adverse effects of drawn-out house price adjustments via collateral effects on credit 
markets  were,  therefore,  probably  less  pronounced  but  more  persistent  than  in  high  inflation 
countries. 
 
Interest rate policies at the time of the boom reflect the fact that external adjusters’ monetary 
policies were geared at exchange rate targeting where high capital inflows kept interest rates less 
counter-cyclical than the strong demand (and asset price) boom might have otherwise suggested. 
Initially,  interest  rates  also  stayed  high  during  the  bust,  first  to  defend  the  exchange  rate  and 
subsequently to fight inflationary pressures (Chart A6). Internal adjusters pursued somewhat more 
counter-cyclical policies and real interest rates rose more strongly in the boom while coming down 
gradually in the bust.  
 
Turning  to  competitiveness  and  the  trade  channel,  we  find  a  strong  divergence  in 
competitiveness and trade developments over time and across country groups. We start with unit 
labour costs (ULC) which followed a very similar pattern as real and financial variables did before 
with ULC growth increasing over the boom before declining significantly in the bust (Chart A7). 
The internal adjusters experienced a much more gradual trend of unit labour cost increases and 
decreases.  External  adjusters,  however,  first  experienced  significant  ULC  increase  before 
experiencing a rather sharp reversal.  
 
Real effective exchange rates and unit labour costs together are probably largely responsible for 
the emerging pattern of trade developments and, hence, the role of the trade channel. External 
adjusters experienced much weaker export growth than internal adjusters over the boom period 
(Chart  A8).  In  the  bust  this  relation  reversed.  Export  volume  growth  increased  strongly  in  the 
context of depreciation/devaluation while it remained more muted in countries pursuing internal 
adjustment. As a result export/GDP ratios were roughly flat over the boom and bust cycle for 
internal adjusters (Chart A9). For external adjusters, this ratio first declined in the boom before 
rising again in the bust. This supports the claim that competitiveness changes and the trade channel 
were much less relevant in the case of internal adjusters. This may be the second (and perhaps even 
more important) reason why the growth profile during the bust is that of protracted low growth 
(hammock)  for  internal  adjusters  than  that  of deep  downturn  followed  by  a  rapid  recovery  (V 
shaped) for external adjusters. 
 
Pulling the information from the real and external side together, we should find—and indeed this is 
confirmed in Chart A10—that the current account balance (the counterpart to domestic savings and 
investment balance) deteriorates for the average of all countries in the boom before improving in the 
bust. This pattern is more distinct for external adjusters in the boom and bust due to stronger domestic 
demand growth in excess of output growth and competitiveness loss, slower export growth in the 
boom and a more distinct reversal of these trends in the bust. As regards the level of the current 
account balance, external adjusters on average report a deficit over the full cycle which increases 17
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strongly over the boom. Internal adjusters show a very modest deterioration in the current account in 
the boom and a moderate improvement in the bust and overall levels remain positive throughout the 
cycle. 
 
The international financial channel at first seems less relevant for this sample of countries 
where the volatility of capital flows is normally assumed to play a lesser role. Nevertheless given 
significant current account deficits in one group, the pattern of “other investment flows” (bank 
lending etc) for this group is worth looking at. The literature has identified exposure to short term 
foreign capital as a main vulnerability that could lead to abrupt adjustment needs in periods of 
confidence loss (“sudden stops”). External adjusters experienced strong inflows in the boom (up to 
3% of GDP per annum) and strong outflows over the first three years of the bust (also up to almost 
3% of GDP). In this particular instance it is also worthwhile looking at individual countries in this 
group. The clearest sign of emerging market type “sudden stop” phenomena is visible for Finland 
and in particular Sweden. In the latter case, inflows of other investment amounted to 12.2% of GDP 
in 1990 before reversing to -2.7% in 1991 and staying negative until 1993. In these cases, anecdotal 
evidence also points to strong exposure to foreign-currency denominated debt in the private sector 
but firm data is hard to come by.  
 
What role did fiscal policies play? First, fiscal variables reflect the revenue impact of the boom 
bust cycle where revenue windfalls from capital gains related taxes boost fiscal accounts in the 
boom before reversing in the downturn. Consequently, the fiscal balance improves over the boom 
before deteriorating strongly over the bust (Chart A11). Again there is a difference in magnitude 
and levels in parallel with current account developments: internal adjusters experience better fiscal 
balances  and  a  slower  deterioration  of  fiscal  accounts  than  external  adjusters.  The  data  also 
replicates the findings of Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) who argue that political economy dynamics 
induce insufficient consolidation in the boom (the windfall is spent) and result in significant average 
deficits over the boom-bust cycles. In some (but not all) cases deficits reached magnitudes that 
required pro-cyclical consolidation to avoid macroeconomic destabilization. 
 
The pattern of deficits and growth over boom bust cycles determine public debt developments: 
debt goes down modestly in the boom before rising rapidly in the bust (Chart A12). Another way of 
interpreting this result is that the benefits of the boom are largely “privatized” while the costs are 
“socialized”. In some cases, this socialization was rather direct through bank and balance sheet 
support, e.g., in the cases of Sweden and Finland (Jonung and Stymne, 1997; Eschenbach and 
Schuknecht, 2004). In these countries, debt increased by 30 and 50% of GDP respectively. 
 
While the Chart illustrates well the sustainability risks from boom-bust episodes for external 
adjusters,  it  perhaps  underemphasizes  this  risk  for  internal  adjusters.  Internal  adjusters’  debt 
dynamics look healthier at first but they also become very adverse over time and continue to remain 
adverse for longer as the adjustment period is more prolonged. Japan is the most extreme case in 
point. 
 
Some  simple  statistical  tests  support  the  evidence  as  regards  differences  in  the  means  and 
patterns over boom-bust episodes across the two country groups for most of the variables discussed 
above. Table 3 shows the results for Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney tests for differences in the means of 
the two country groups (“populations”) and tests of equal Variance (F-tests) for differences in the 
volatility of the series.
10 Real effective exchange rates, credit, inflation, export shares and fiscal and 
external  balances  are  found  to  differ  significantly  between  internal  and  external  adjusters.  As 
regards real GDP and export growth, differences in means and volatility are not confirmed. This 
suggests that the main difference between the two groups is not the level and extremeness of the 
business and trade cycle per se while the more accentuated downturns and upswings in the groups 
of external adjusters is not picked up well with this test. The equal variance test finds a significant 
                                                      
10 The test is performed taken the average of each variable for the country groups over the period 1984-
1995. Results in Table 3 show the p-value of the test. 18
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difference in the amplitude of swings for the export share and the current account balance and 
perhaps even more importantly, for unit labour costs and (not quite statistically significant) real 
estate prices.  
Table  3:  Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test  for  selected  indicators,  boom-bust  episodes  in 
industrialised countries in the 1980s and 1990s 




  P-value 
REER  0.08
*  0.62 
Real GDP growth  0.62  0.40 
Real estate prices  0.84  0.14 
Domestic credit growth  0.09
*  0.22 
Inflation  0.00
***  0.77 
ULC  0.89  0.06 
Export growth (volumes)  0.98  0.61 
Export (% of GDP)  0.002
***  0.002 
Current account balance, % of GDP  0.00
***  0.03 
Fiscal balance, % of GDP  0.003
***  0.29 
Public debt, % of GDP  0.26  0.16 
Interest rate  0.00
***  0.77 
Note: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Each series has 12 observations. 
 
In summary, these stylised facts and statistical tests confirm the hypotheses expressed above: 
the domestic financial, trade and fiscal channels seem to contribute to the evolution of boom-bust 
episodes.  Countries  on  average  depicted  the  expected  pattern  of  economic  and  financial 
developments. However, external adjusters were prone to experience more pronounced upswings 
with  stronger  asset  price  and  credit  growth,  more  competitiveness  loss  and  unfavourable  trade 
developments, external vulnerability due to cumulative external imbalances, and less favourable 
fiscal  positions.  In  the  bust,  external  adjusters  experienced  more  pronounced  troughs  as 
competitiveness loss and balance sheet problems depressed demand. But once the currency was 
floated/devalued, growth also recovered more swiftly and forcefully, as exports rose and imports 
were being replaced by domestic output. The group of internal adjusters experienced fewer and 
smaller  macroeconomic  imbalances  at  the  end  of  the  boom  and  economic  and  financial 
developments were less volatile. However, internal adjustment implied a more prolonged real and 
financial downturn. 
 
While the findings clearly illustrate the intersectoral linkages that are at work, it is also important 
to point to systemic risks that can arise from their interplay. In Sweden, Finland and Japan, busts 
turned into financial crisis and both groups of countries were affected. Sweden and Finland also 
faced emerging market-type reversals of capital flows. They floated their currencies as part of the 
crisis  resolution  strategy.  This  strategy  reinforced  immediate  adjustment  needs  in  the  real  and 
financial sectors but also facilitated the emergence from the bust. Internal adjustment, pursued by 
Japan, did not prevent crisis but its emergence was delayed and its impact was felt in a more 
protracted manner. 
3.2  Econometric analysis 
In this section we conduct an econometric analysis to underpin the stylised facts and statistical 
analysis on boom and bust periods presented above. In a first step, we analyse empirically the 
macroeconomic patterns that coincide with the incidence of booms and busts. For this purpose we 
use a panel probit analysis where the incidence of a boom or bust is the dependent variable and a 
number of macroeconomic variables reflecting the five transmission channels explained in section 2 
constitute the independent variables. In more detail, the estimated model takes the form: 
) , ( ) , 1 ( Pr t t t t it x F x y ob β β = =  19
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where  t x  corresponds to our set of macroeconomic variables reflecting the five transmission 
channels and  t β  is a vector of unknown parameters. The observed variable  it y  receives a value of 0 
or 1 depending on whether a boom/bust has occurred or not.
11 With a probit model, the right-hand 
side of the model is constrained between 0 and 1, and is compared to the observed value  it y . The 
probit model assumes that the probability distribution function ( it y  conditional on  t x ) corresponds 
to a normal distribution.  
 
In total, the analysis is conducted on a sample of 20 countries. As for external adjusters the 
sample  contains:  Belgium,  Germany,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Australia,  Canada,  Finland,  Italy, 
Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom.  As  regards  the  internal  adjusters  we  use:  Austria, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the United States, France, Japan and Switzerland. Note that the 
sample of countries in the empirical analysis is larger than presented in Table 1 (which contains all 
the countries included in the descriptive analysis). The main reason for expanding the sample is to 
increase the degrees of freedom in the model. The selection procedure for the additional countries is 
the  same  as  those  for  the  countries  in  the  descriptive  analysis  (both  for  the  definition  of 
internal/external adjuster as well as the classification of boom and bust episodes).
12 
 
In a second step, we go more deeply into the factors that determine whether, in a bust, a country 
becomes an external or internal adjuster. For this purpose we rely on a probit cross-sectional analysis 
of the countries as mentioned above. The dependent variable takes in this case the value 1 if the 
country was an external adjuster in the bust and 0 otherwise. The independent variables consist of the 
same financial and macroeconomic variables that were seen as interacting in the emergence of booms 
and busts. We took the average of the last three years preceding the bust for these variables to test 
whether the effect of developments in the boom affected the probability of being an external versus 
internal adjuster in the bust. 
 
The results of the first part of the analysis, namely the panel probit analysis on boom bust 
patterns, are presented in Table 4 which shows two models each for estimating the incidence of 
booms and busts. The “boom” models find that a number of macroeconomic variables related to 
most of the five transmission channels discussed above are significant to explain the incidence of 
booms. In addition, some control variables turn out to be significant as well.
13  
 
More  specifically,  the  models  suggest  that  strong  private  investment  growth  and  a  positive 
current account balance coincide with the incidence of a boom one or two periods later. In addition, 
low real interest rates, a low degree of financial depth and a high degree of trade openness increase 
the likelihood of a boom. Favourable public deficit figures (a budget surplus and low public debt) 
also appear to be positively correlated with the incidence of a boom in the ensuing period. This, 
however, is more likely to be a side-effect of buoyant growth rather than any causal link. The 
bottom part of Tables 4 reveals that the percentage of booms correctly predicted by the models is 
very high (94 and 81% respectively). By contrast, the number of periods identified as booms which 
were not booms is relatively low (35 and 25% respectively). 
 
                                                      
11 In case of the boom model, all non-boom periods receive a value of 0. In case of the bust model, all non-
bust periods receive a value of 0. 
12 The added countries were not included in the descriptive analysis in Section 3.1. Either the boom period 
was not immediately followed by a bust for these countries or the countries only experienced a boom or a bust 
over the sample period considered. For the added countries, the following boom and bust episodes were 
detected: Austria (bust: 98-02), Belgium (bust: 80-85),Germany (boom: 87-93, bust: 95-05), Ireland (boom: 
94-01), the Netherlands (boom: 93-00), Norway (boom: 83-86/92-97), US (boom: 95-99, bust: 01-02), New 
Zealand (bust: 89-91, boom: 92-97), Greece (boom: 94-05), Portugal (bust: 90-92, boom: 96-99). 
13  Most  explanatory  variables  enter  the  probit  model  with  a  lag,  hence  avoiding  the  problem  of 
endogeneity. In two cases, the variables enter contemporaneously. This is the case of fiscal balances and trade 
openness. However for these variables the endogeneity problem may be limited. 20
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When  looking  at  the  incidence  of  busts  (models  3-4  of  Table  4),  the  results  of  the  probit 
estimates suggest that higher real interest rates, high unit labour cost growth, outflows of “other 
(international) investments” and current account deficits indicate a higher probability of a bust in 
the ensuing period. Trade openness is negatively correlated with the probability of a bust. Turning 
to  fiscal  policy,  large  public  deficits  and  a  higher  level  of  public  debt  appear  to  precede  the 
incidence of busts in a significant manner. The models do not predict the incidence of busts as well 
as that of booms, with only 67 and 55% respectively of all bust episodes correctly anticipated. The 
number of periods falsely identified as busts is, however, also rather low (28 and 18% respectively). 
Table 4: Probit model of booms and busts – coefficient estimates 
  Dependent variable: incidence of boom  Dependent variable: incidence of bust 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Independent variables         
Credit channel       
Real interest rate (-2/-1/-1/-1)  -0.12 (-3.72)
**  -0.01 (-6.18)
**  0.14 (4.33)
 **  0.09(2.96)
 ** 
       
Trade channel       
Unit labour costs (-1/-1/-1)  -0.01 (-2.19)
**  -0.00 (-0.11)  0.01 (2.42)
**  
Inflation (-1)        0.01 (1.59) 
       
Int. financial channel       
Other investment flows (-1/-1)  -0.00 (-0.88)    -0.01 (-2.37)
**  
       
Demand channel       
Cumulative private consumption growth (-1)  -0.08 (-1.60)       
Cumulative private investment growth (-1/-1)  0.02 (3.42)
**  0.01 (1.91)
**    
Current account balance (-2/-1/-1/-1)  0.01 (0.37)  0.03 (2.09)
**  -0.11 (-3.67)
**  -0.12 (-3.92)
** 
       
Fiscal balance       
Fiscal balances(0/0/0/0)  0.04 (1.71)
*  0.10 (3.72)
 **  -0.03 (-2.20)
**  -0.6 (-2.2)
** 
Public debt (-1/-1/-1/-1)  -0.03 (-5.63)
**  -0.02 (-4.21)
**  0.01 (3.51)
**  0.01 (1.81)
** 
       
Other control variables       
Financial depth (credit/GDP) (-2/-2/-1/-1)  -0.01 (-6.60)
**  -0.03 (-8.0)
**  0.00 (1.68)
**  0.00 (4.45)
** 
Trade openness (0/0/0/0)  0.00 (2.69)
**  0.01 (1.79)
**  -0.02 (-3.92)
**  -0.02 (-4.07)
** 
       
Constant  3.23 (5.54)
**  4.46 (6.60)
**  -2.07(-4.94)
**  -1.27 (-2.78)
** 
       
R
2  95  97  98  99 
       
Booms/busts correctly anticipated  94%  81%  67%  55% 
Booms/Busts incorrectly anticipated  35%  25%  28%  18% 
*/** significance at 90/95% level. Note that the numbers between brackets show the lags introduced of the right-hand side 
variables. 
 
In a next step – as mentioned above – we consider the factors that determine whether a country 
becomes either an external or internal adjuster. A range of determinants are considered, analogous 
to those used in the first analysis. The overall findings are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 
shows the general results for the various determinants we considered (ranging from fiscal variables 
to domestic and external variables). Table 6 then presents the results from selected regressions 
which turned out to have the “best” predictive power for the exchange rate adjustment experience. 
Given the limited degrees of freedom we first present regressions with at least one variable from 
each transmission channel (models 1 and 2) before moving to more parsimonious models including 
the most robust variables only (models 3 and 4). 21
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Table 5: Main regression result findings 
Variable  Sign coefficient  Significance 
Dependent variable: exchange rate adjustment experience 
External adjustment=1, internal adjustment=0 
Demand channel  
  Growth  Switches sign  Not always 
  Investment  Negative  Not always 
Trade channel 
  CPI inflation  Positive  Not always 
  Unit labour cost  Switches sign  Not always 
Credit channel 
  Interest rate  Positive  Always 
  Credit growth  Positive  Always 
International financial channel 
  Other portfolio investment  Positive  Always 
  Current account  Negative  Always 
Fiscal Variables    
  Fiscal balance  Negative  Not always 
  Public debt  Switches sign  Never 
Control variables 
  Total openness  Positive  Always 
Note:   Not all variables can be estimated simultaneously in the regression due to the low number of observations. The 
results are presented at the 90% significance level. 
Several results can be derived from the two tables which broadly confirm the earlier analysis of 
stylised facts and the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney tests). Robust results were obtained for the credit 
channel and external variables. Indeed, both credit growth and interest rates are always significant 
and the regression results suggest that stronger credit growth and higher real interest rates increase 
the likelihood that the country goes through an external adjustment during a bust. This likelihood 
also increases with stronger other portfolio investment flows (as a % of the nation’s GDP) or with a 
higher current account deficit. And more generally, openness to trade seems to heighten the chance 
that a country goes through an external adjustment process.  
 
Second, concerning the trade channel, we do systematically find that higher consumer price 
inflation tends to increase the probability that the country becomes an external adjuster, though the 
significance of this result is not fully robust.  
 
As to the demand variables, GDP growth and investment growth, the findings warrant some 
more discussion. Higher investment growth during the boom tends to increase the likelihood of 
being an internal adjuster which could be interpreted as a sign that an investment driven boom is 
more benign than a consumption driven one. GDP growth, not unexpectedly, is a poor indicator of 
the type of exchange rate adjustment. Moreover unit labour cost growth is not proving a good 
predictor  of  being  an  external  versus  internal  adjuster.  Further  analysis  in  this  regard  appears 
warranted. 
 
As regards fiscal variables, a negative sign for the fiscal balance variable implies that a higher 
fiscal deficit in the years preceding a bust increases the likelihood that the country becomes an 
external adjuster during the bust. However, this result is not always statistically significant across 
different estimations. 
 
While Table 5 reports the overall performance of various models in predicting the exchange rate 
adjustment, Table 6 reports the specific coefficients and T-values for the two “best models” which 
illustrate the broader results.  22
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Table 6: Regression results: two sample (best) models 





Growth    0.37 
(1.58) 


















Current account    -0.79
** 
(-2.59) 











*/** significance at 90/95% level. 
 
For these “best models”, we checked the predicted role of the exchange rate in adjustment versus 
the actual incidence of internal versus external adjustment. For 14 out of the 17 countries, the 
external versus internal adjustment strategy was anticipated correctly for the first model, while it 
was  anticipated  correctly  for  16  out  of  the  17  countries  for  the  second  model.
14  The  more 
parsimonious models perform equally well with 15-16 correctly anticipated adjustment strategies. 
These econometric results, while very preliminary, appear to suggest that domestic and international 
financial variables best predict the adjustment pattern. 
4. The Central and East European EU Member States 
Finally, we look at the recent experiences and economic situation of nine CEE EU Member 
States, which can be grouped into two sub-groups, first the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia 




For the purposes of this paper there are two key differences between these groups. The CEE4 are 
a group of (very) small open economies that decided early on in the transformation process to 
(largely) forego active monetary and exchange rate policy and established currency boards instead. 
They can thus be considered as internal adjusters. The CEE5 countries are small- to medium-size 
open  economies  which,  despite  significant  country-specific  differences  in  their  monetary  and 
exchange-rate  policy,  tend  to  make  more  active  use  of  monetary  and  exchange-rate  policy 
instruments than the CEE4. However, ERM II membership and ultimately euro adoption implies for 
these countries that they will also have to ultimately move to an internal adjustment strategy (Backé 
et al. 2004, Schadler et al. 2005) although the timing of this shift will be again country-specific. 
 
As in Section 3.1 we use again Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney tests for differences in the means of the 
two country groups (CEE4 and CEE5) and tests of equal Variance (F-tests) for differences in the 
volatility of the series (see Table 7).  
                                                      
14   For the internal versus external adjustment estimations only 17 countries were included out of 20 since for 
three countries no bust occurred during the sample period (only a boom). 
15   Slovenia has not been included in either of these two groups. With regard to asset price and economic 
growth development it would fit into the CEE5 group of countries, but it follows an internal adjustment 
strategy. In fact Slovenia has joined the euro area on 1 January 2007.  23
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Table 7: Wilcoxon signed ranks test for selected indicators, boom-bust episodes in the 
CEE4 versus CEE5 countries 




  P-value 
REER  0.743  0.373 
Real GDP growth  0.100
*  0.002 
Domestic credit growth  0.017
**  0.020 
Inflation  0.330  0.0001 
Export growth (volumes)  0.838  0.160 
Export (% of GDP)  0.030
**  0.009 
Current account balance, % of 
GDP 
0.091
*  0.083 
Fiscal balance, % of GDP  0.004
***  0.019 
Public debt, % of GDP  0.000
***  0.001 
Note: ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Each series has 12 observations covering 
the period 1994 to 2005. For interest rate, unit labour costs and real estate prices insufficient observations were available 
to perform the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. 
 
Most variables are found to differ significantly between the CEE4 and the CEE 5 group of 
countries.  Only  for  the  real  effective  exchange  rate,  inflation  and  export  growth  differences  in 
means and/or volatility are not confirmed. Overall, however, these results suggest that it is indeed 
analytically meaningful to differentiate between these two sub-groups and to look at the difference 
in their economic development.  
 
In line with the analytical framework used for industrialised country case studies, we start our 
stock-taking exercise of the variables underlying the different transmission channels by first looking 
at real effective exchange rate developments in the CEE4 and the CEE5. Chart B1 shows a trend 
appreciation of the REER in both country groups. This is not surprising, given that these countries 
experience a real convergence process towards the euro area (and EU) average. However, the rate of 
appreciation was stronger over the last few years in the CEE5 countries, whereas the appreciation 
trend flattened in the CEE4. 
 
Real economic growth in the CEE5 countries was in recent years far below the growth rates of 
the CEE4. In fact, it was rather similar to growth rates experienced by industrialised countries 
during  boom  periods  (Chart  B2).
16  By  contrast,  the  rate  of  economic  expansion  in  the  CEE4 
countries is very rapid.
17 
 
Analyses  of  the  domestic  financial  environment  in  the  CEE  countries  are  unfortunately 
plagued with severe data problems.
18 However, the CEE countries have seen very buoyant credit 
growth in recent years. This applies in particular to the CEE4 (over 50% in 2005) but also to some 
CEE5 countries (see Chart B3).
19 As a result, private sector debt-to-GDP ratios are beginning to 
increase, especially in the Baltic countries. Although debt is still relatively low compared e.g. to the 
euro area average (see Chart B4) there are indications that the net financial position of non-financial 
corporations  in  the  CEE  countries  is  less  advantageous  than  in  the  euro  area  (due  to  a  less 
favourable asset position). Looking at asset price developments, stock markets in the CEE countries 
                                                      
16   On growth prospects in the new central European EU Member States see e.g. Arratibel et al (2007), 
European Commission (2004) or Wagner and Hlouskova (2002). 
17 In fact, only the Asian emerging economies experienced similarly strong rates of economic expansion 
during their boom period until 1995. This similarity can also be observed for consumption and investment 
developments. 
18   For a detailed overview of credit developments in the CEE countries see Backé and Zumer (2005) or 
European Central Bank (2006a).  
19   Cottarelli et al (2003) do not see the recent evolution of bank credit in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans as troublesome. However, the results of their empirical work are based on developments only up 
to 2003.  24
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have mostly experienced very fast growth in the recent past.
20 Data on house price developments in 
the CEE countries are unfortunately still rather patchy and heterogeneous. Taken together, however, 
available country-specific evidence clearly suggests a general picture of very strong growth for real 
estate prices in the CEECs with real annual house price increases mostly in the double-digit range in 
recent years.
21  
                                                      
20   Data on stock market developments are shown in Annex Chart 1. 
21  A very useful overview on this issue is provided by Egert and Mihaljek (2007). 25
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The very dynamic growth of credit in recent years is likely to have been influenced by the strong 
trend decline in real short-term interest rates observed in the CEE in general and particularly in the 
CEE4. In fact, real short-term interest rates in the CEE4 have recently fallen to levels below those 
seen in the groups of external and internal adjusters in the late 1980s.  Furthermore, the share of 
foreign currency loans in per cent of total loans has reached very high levels, in particular in the 
Baltic  countries  where  long-established  currency  boards  and  the  associated  perception  of  low 
currency risks make foreign currency loans with a lower interest rate particularly attractive (see 
Chart  B5).
22  However,  despite  the  at  times  considerable  exchange  rate  volatility  in  the  CEE5 
countries foreign currency loans also play a sizeable role in this group. This applies not only to 
euro-denominated loans but also to loans denominated Japanese Yen and Swiss Francs.
23  
 
Price  developments  in  the  CEE4  and  the  CEE5  since  1999  are  characterised  by  a  strong 
disinflation period in the CEE5 (strongly influenced by initially very high inflation in Romania) and 
relatively benign inflation between 1999 and 2003 in the CEE4 (see Chart B6). During the last three 
years, however, inflation in the CEE4 has picked up to levels above 5%, well above the CEE5 and 
euro area average.  
 
Turning to the trade and international competitiveness channel, unit labour cost increases in 
the CEE5 have experienced a trend decline for a number of years largely due to very high gains in 
productivity (see Chart B7). However, although productivity increases in the CEE4 countries were 
also quite significant, ULC increase quite strongly in these countries since 2000. This is largely due 
to increasing wage growth in recent years, which in turn is related to emerging labour market 
bottlenecks in a very high growth environment. 
 
Export growth was buoyant in both groups of CEE Member States since 2000 although the 
CEE4 recently experienced a slight decline in export volume growth (see Chart B8). Turning to the 
current account, however, both country groups show persistent deficits during the entire observation 
period  (see  Chart  B9).  Moreover,  current  account  imbalances  in  the  CEE4  countries  worsened 
considerably since 2002, reaching almost 12% of GDP in 2006. Given that the CEE countries are 
catching-up  economies,  current  account  deficits  are  not  surprising,  also  in  view  of  the  large 
investment  needs  of  rapidly  transforming  economies.  However,  whereas  the  gap  in  investment 
growth between the CEE4 and the CEE5 averages has recently closed, the current account gap has 
widened significantly, suggesting that at least part of the CEE4’s external imbalance originates from 
consumption rather than investment. In fact, these are the highest, persistent external imbalances 
experienced by any of the sample countries in this study. 
 
Looking at the main sources of international finance
24 used to cover the external imbalances in 
the CEE countries, some similarities between the sub-groups emerge. FDI inflows are significant in 
the entire region, although they tended to decrease somewhat in the recent past. This can largely be 
explained by the trend decline in privatisations in these countries. By contrast, portfolio and other 
investment increased until 2003 in both country groups. Since then inflows into the CEE5 remained 
more or less constant respectively decreased in 2006. By contrast, this relatively volatile forms of 
international capital inflows reached almost 8% of GDP in the CEE4 in 2004 and again in 2006 (see 
Chart B10).  
 
Finally,  turning  to  fiscal  developments  since  1999,  public  accounts  in  the  CEE4  recovered 
steadily from the aftermath of the Russian crisis and remained at or close to balance since 2003 (see 
                                                      
22   Comparable recent data for Bulgaria and Romania is not available. 
23 The financial sector in CEE countries is very heavily dominated by foreign banks, mostly from the EU. 
This implies that lending standards are likely to be generally of quite high standards. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25 With very strong growth in recent years, the CEE4 record nearly balanced fiscal 
accounts on average. By contrast, fiscal balances in the CEE5 countries gradually deteriorated until 
2002 and only the last few years saw some moderate improvement. As a result, public debt in the 
CEE5 remained close to 40%, still well below the EU average but well above the public debt ratio 
afforded by most emerging markets (Afonso, Nickel and Rother, 2005) (see Chart B12).  
 
Summing up, the CEE countries are currently experiencing a period of strong credit and asset 
price  growth  in  conjunction  with  rapid  economic  expansion.  On  the  basis  of  the  stylised  facts 
discussion above, this pattern appears more pronounced and advanced in the CEE4 countries while 
the CEE5 countries seem to be at an earlier stage of the process.  
 
5. Conclusions  
This study has derived stylised facts and some preliminary statistical and econometric analysis 
for a number of boom - bust episodes in asset prices in industrialized countries, notably as regards 
the role of the exchange rate in the adjustment process. It distinguishes external adjustment with 
real effective exchange rate devaluation versus internal adjustment without such devaluation).  
 
The findings support the claim that real and financial variables interact in boom-bust episodes 
where asset price cycles and their impact on private balance sheets constitute an important driving 
force. Most importantly, countries’ different exchange rate adjustment experiences are correlated 
with  the  extent  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  the  degree  of  balance  sheet  vulnerability. 
Together with relatively loose fiscal policies, this stoked asset price and consumer price inflation 
and domestic demand. At the same time it reinforced competitiveness losses in the boom which – 
when fortunes reversed – exacerbated the bust and the resulting adjustment needs. In those cases 
where the exchange rate was devalued, this shift in policy first reinforced balance sheet problems in 
the private sector but then precipitated a rapid recovery. From this we conclude: 
 
•  External  adjusters  tend  to  experience  more  pronounced  booms  with  more  overheating  of 
demand, increases in prices and credit, loss of competitiveness and deterioration of (private 
sector, external and public) balance sheets than reported for internal adjusters.  
 
•  In  busts,  external  adjusters  tend  to  experience  deep  downturns  and  rapid  recoveries  as 
imbalances  are  initially  more  severe  but,  subsequently,  also  unwind  more  quickly.  Internal 
adjusters tend to face less deep but more protracted downturns as imbalances unwind more 
slowly and adjustment via the trade and credit channels takes more time.  
 
•  Statistical and preliminary econometric analysis broadly confirms stylised facts on boom bust 
episodes,  with  domestic  and  international  financial  variables  appearing  to  have  the  most 
significant predictive power for the role of the exchange rate in adjustment. 
 
The study seems to confirm many “orthodox” messages: 
 
•  The  more  significant  demand  and  financial  excesses,  competitiveness  loss,  and  fiscal  and 
external imbalances in the course of the boom the more likely it seems that a country would be 
found in the group of external adjusters in the bust. 
 
•  Internal adjustment appears to be more prevalent when external and fiscal imbalances are small, 
and when credit growth, inflation and competitiveness loss is contained during the boom. 
 
                                                      
25   For a useful overview of fiscal developments in most CEE countries see the ECB’s Convergence Reports 
in 2006 (ECB 2006b and ECB 2006c).  29
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Stylised facts for the CEE EU Member States suggest that they are currently experiencing a 
period of strong credit and asset price growth in conjunction with rapid economic expansion. This 
pattern appears more pronounced and advanced in the CEE4 countries while the CEE5 countries 
seem to be at an earlier stage of the process.  
Clear and definite conclusions as to the situation and prospects can not be drawn for the CEE EU 
Member  States,  not  least  due  to  the  serious  data  problems  for  these  countries  as  well  as  the 
difficulties  in  distinguishing  booms  from  catching-up  effects.  In  addition,  the  institutional 
framework  provided  by  EU  membership  and  the  prospect  of  euro  adoption  –  once  the  CEE 
countries  fulfill  the  Maastricht  convergence  criteria  –  are  specific  to  this  group  of  countries. 
Nevertheless the experiences of other countries may raise awareness of related policy challenges in 
the CEE countries.  30
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Annex Table: Data and Sources 
Real effective exchange rate (REER): IMF/WEO database, Global Insight/World Market 
Monitor database and ECB. 
Real economy/demand channel 
Real economic growth: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database.  
Real private consumption: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database.  
Real private investment: OECD/OEO and IMF/WEO database, European 
Commission/AMECO database and Eurostat.  
Total employment: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database and European 
Commission/AMECO database.  
Domestic financial/credit channel 
Asset price/real estate price indices: BIS, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Credit: IMF/IFS database. 
Loans: ECB. 
Private debt: ECB 
Real short-term interest: OECD/OEO.  
Inflation: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database.  
Trade/competitiveness channel 
Real unit labour costs: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database, and Eurostat.  
Export volumes: IMF/WEO database. 
Import volumes: IMF/WEO database. 
Exports: IMF/WEO database. 
Imports: IMF/WEO database. 
International financial channel 
Current account balance: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database.  
Foreign Direct Investment: IMF/WEO database. 
Portfolio: IMF/WEO database. 
Other investment: IMF/WEO database. 
Fiscal channel 
Fiscal balance (adjusted for one-off UMTS receipts): OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO 
database.  
Public debt: OECD/OEO database and IMF/WEO database and European 
Commission/AMECO database.  
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